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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOWE RENTS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.JOHN WORTHEN, dba Exotic
Swimming Pool Company,
Defendant-Appellant

Case
No.10583

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff seeks to recover the cost of repair to a
cement mixer plaintiff had leased to defendant, and
which came loose while defendant was towing it.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case came to the court for trial, and judgment
\ms awarded to plaintiff on the statements of counsel

ancl the pleadings, without the introduction of evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a
11cw trial.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is in the business of leasing equipment to
the public. Defendant, a swimming pool builder, on Au
gust 4, 1962, rented a large two-wheeler cement mixer
from plaintiff, and signed a lease which stated in part,
''Lessee assumes all liability for damages from accident
caused by or incurred in the use or transportation or
said equipment, and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the said Lessor, its officers, agents and employees
from any and all damages and/or liability to any person
whomsoever arising out of or resulting from the use,
storage or transportation of said equipment by the Lessee
or by anyone else while the equipment is in the custody
of the Lessee. Lessee acknowledges receipt of the equipment in good working condition and repair and agrees
to return it in as good condition, subject to reasonable
wear and tear, and Lessee shall be liable for all damage
to or loss of the equipment regardless of cause until it
shall have been returned to and receipted for by thP
Lessor." (Ex. P-1)
Without assistance from defendant, plaintiff attached the mixer to defendant's two-ton truck (R. 4, 7,
38), by means of a chain and ball hitch. The connection
was made as illustrated in defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3
and 4 (R. 34, 35, 36, 37). The bolt of the ball hitch was
passed through a hole on a trailer tow plate welded to
the truck. Plaintiff had no safety catch on the ball
hitch.

2
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The mixer had a metal chain welded to its towing
har. Plaintiff connected the chain directly to the frame
of the truck. (R. 34.)
The mixer was rented at 5 :53 p.m., Saturday, August 4, 1962, at plaintiff's place of business at 2375 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant drove
directly to his home at 620 Grand Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and the trailer remained there attached to the
truck, and untouched to defendant's knowledge, until
:\Ionday, Augsut 6, 1962. Defendant then started to drive
to Logan. About thirty-three miles from his starting
point at plaintiff's place of business, the mixer came
loose, the chain snapped and the mixer overturned, causing it damage. No other damage or injury is involved
in this case. Defendant at no time touched the truck mixer connections before the accident. After the accident
defendant observed that the towing bar was bent sharply
upward (R. 3, 7, 38, 39).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF ITS STATUTORY DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AND WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS.
Plaintiff violated the provisions of 41-6-117 UCA,
1953, and 41-6-148.40 UCA, 1953, as amended 1961.
"41-6-117.

VEHICLE IN UNSAFE CONDITION OR

IMPROPERLY EQUIPPED-VIOLATION OF AcT-MrsDE-

3
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MEANOR - AccEssonrns - ExcEPTION AS To FAi:i·
IMPLEMENTS AND RoAD l\IAcrrINEilY. - (a) ft is .n
misdemeanor for any person to drive or move 111
for the owner to cause or knowingly 7Jer111d fiJ /,,
driren. or moved on any highway any vehiclf' 111
combinaiion of rehicles which is in sul'h u11sn1,
condition as to endanger any person, or which r/n 1.,
not contain those parts or is not at all ti 1111.,
equipped with such lamps and other equipment i,
proper condition and adjustment as required i
this article, or which is equipped in any manner i11
violation of this act, or for any person to do am
act forbidden or fail to perform any act require;!
under this act." (Emphasis added)
,
1

The absence on the hitch of a safety catch on the nul
and bolt (R. 36) might in itself be construed to be

at 1

"unsafe condition," because the towing of a vehicle wll
loosen the connection.

'l'he owner knowingly

permittiu~

towing of his rented units knO"ws that some will becomi
separated unless safety catches are used.

"41-6-148.40. SAFETY CHAINS OF TowED \"1HICLES REQUIRED - ExcEPTIONS - SAFETY Cmm
ON TRAILERs-E1 ery toiced vehicle shall be cntr
pled by means of a safety chain, cable, or equiYi·
lent device, in addition to the regular trailer hilrl
or coupling.
1

1

(a) Such safety chain, cable or equivalent. ck
vice shall be securely connected with the chassis nl
the towing vehicle, the toiced i·ehicle and 1111
drawbar.
(b) It shall be of sufficient material anil
strength to preyent the two vehicles from hrcoro·
ing separated, and shall have no more slack f/iall
is necessary for proper turning.
4
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( c) Such safety chain, cable or equivalent <le\'ice shall be attached to the trailer drawbar (so)
as to vrevent it from dropping to the ground, and
to assure the towed vehicle follows substantially
in the course of the towing vehicle in case the veliicl e ( s) become separated.
( <l) This requirement does not apply to a
semitrailer having a connecting device composed
of a fifth wheel and king pin assembly, nor to a
pole trailer." (Emphasis added)
This statute implements 41-6-117, UCA, 1953. Plaintiff violated this statute in two ways: (1) The chain was
so slack that the towing bar hit the ground when the vehicles became separated, and (2) The chain was not connected to the mixer chassis (R. 34).
Had plaintiff complied with the foregoing statutes,
no loss would have occurred. These statutes were enadecl for the protection of the public. Their violation,
when proximately causing an injury is negligence.
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791.
POINT 2.
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF FOR PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE CANNOT BE
ENFORCED.
For a contract to require one person to insure another against the other's own negligence, two things are
required: First, the contract language must be so explirit that there is no doubt that both parties intended
one to insure the other, and Second, the agreement must
5
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not be contrary to public policy. Union Pacific Ry. c11 •
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P2d 910·
Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 371 P2d 131 (Kans.),
Otis Eleuator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 33 P2<l
974 (Colo).
In regard to the contract language, it states in part.
" ... Lessee shall be liable for all damage to or loss of
the equipment regardless of cause until it shall have bm
returned .... '' This language is not so explicit as to ad
vise defendant that he had to look back over his shoulder
for sabotage from plaintiff. If the contract after, "regardless of cause,'' had added merely "including negligence of Lessor,'' then it would be truly explicit. Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 1938, §1041, sets forth the
general principle,
''The bailor is subject to the same implied warwanties as one who sold goods. Therefore the
hailor is liable if he knowingly furnishes property
unsuitable for the purpose for which it was
hired.''
To relieve a party of his obligation is contrary to this
policy of the law and both very precise wording to that
effect, and, as applied, a loss which the parties would contemplate as coming within the insuring clause, are required for such a shift of responsibility. This is stated
in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co ..
supra,
''In resolving a dispute about the. int~rp1:eta
tion of provisions in a contract the obJechve i~ to
determine what the parties intended at the tnm
it was executed; and if the intent with respect to
6
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some unf orseseen subsequent occurrence is not
clearly articulated, what would have been their
intent if their minds had adverted to such an oceurrence. In pursuing the latter alternative, as
we are required to do in this instance, there are
some further basic principles which are helpful on
our problem. The first is that each party is entitled to assume that the other intends to conduct himself as a reasonable and prudent person
should under whatever circumstances may thereafter arise, which presupposes that he will commit
no wrongful act nor be guilty of negligence.''
In regard to public policy, the basic principle is that
a party may not, by contract, relieve himself of a duty of
care which he owes to the public. In Hunter v . .American
Rentals, Inc., supra, lessee of a rental trailer sued the
lessor for damages sustained when the trailer came loose
due to lessor's negligence. The court found the lessee
to be a member of the public to whom the lessor owed
duties of care. Lessor sought to avoid liability based on
the follO"wing lease clause, "The renter hereby absolves
the American Rentals of any responsibility or obligation in the event of an accident, regardess of causes or
consequences, and that any costs, claims, court or attorney fees, or liability resulting from the use of described
equipment will be indemnified by the renter regardless
against whom the claimant or claimants institute action.''
The court held this clause to be void and unenforceable as
contrary to public policy, stating,

''There is no doubt that the rule that forbids a
person to protect himself by agreement against
damages resulting from his own negligence applies
where the agreement protects him against the
7
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consequences of a breach of some duty imposei'
by law." (371 P2d at 133.)

It might be argued that Hunter v. American Re11tol.
Inc., dealt with damage, not to the rental unit, but to iii.
lessee's person and car, and that the only item in issu1
in the case at bar is the mixer, and that defendant iii
sured it. This argument might have validity under soni,
circumstances. For example, if lessee, while using !lie
mixer, burned out the motor because lessor had hrt
negligent by not lubricating it, lessee might he liahli·
Under those circumstances issues of public policy ar1
not involn•d. Here, ho",ever, plaintiff seeks to reconr
for a loss caused, or contributed to, hy plaintiff's 01n
breach of safety statutes. To give plaintiff relief woul1l
allow plaintiff to operate outside the law. Union Pard11
Ry. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra, states thi·
matter as follows,
11

"A closely related proposition pertinent hrr,
is that the law does not look "·ith favor upon one
exacting a covenant to relie,,e himself of the basi1·
duty \d1ich the la"· impos0s on ever:vone: that 0i
nsi~O' due cnre for the saf0tv of himself and otl1
ers. '"'This would tencl to e1;courage ca releRsnr>'
and would net he salutan· either for the pers01
seeking to protect himself or for those whos"
safefr mav he hazarded hv his <'ondnct. For the'"
reas~ns st~ch covenants a;e sometim0s derlarrd i11·
valid as being against public polic~·. Howcwr
this mav depend upon the <'ircnmstanPes. Tlw.m:;
iorifr r ule appears to he that in most situati.on'
01
•
•
where
s1wh is the desir0 of the parties,
an cl t! I'
clearlv understood and expressed, such a covenan'
will l;e upheld. But the presumption is ag-at 11 ' 1
1

0
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any such intention, and it is not achieved by inference or implication from general language such
as was employed here. It will be regarded as a
binding contractual obligation only when that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed.
''If it had been the intent of the parties that
the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff even
against the latter's negligent acts, it would have
been easy enough to use that very language and to
thus make that intent clear and unmistakable,
which was not done here.''

Respectfully submitted,

K. SAMUEL KING,

409 Bost-On Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
.Attorney for Defendant
and .Appellant
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